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Crewmen Under Contract to PrQfessional Salvor May
Claim Salvage Award-Nicholas E. Vernicos
Shipping Co. v. United States*
Several United States Navy store ships imperiled during a violent
squall off the Greek coast were aided by two tugs outfitted with
special salvage equipment and owned by Greek companies terming
themselves professional salvors. The tug crewmen were the firms'
fulltime employees; they were expected to undertake salvage work
when available and to engf1ge in ordinary harbor towing between
salvage operations. The owners sued the United States on behalf of
themselves and their crews to recover compensation for assisting the
Navy. The district court, finding that the store ships had been ren•
dered a salvage service, made separate awards to the owners and to
each crewman aboard the Greek vessels during the operation.1 On
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed.
The crewmen of a vessel owned by a professional salvor who engage
in salvage on a regular but non-exclusive basis may receive modest
salvage awards when the "conscience of admiralty" is moved to grant
them.
A salvage service is any voluntary assistance which is at least
partially successful in relieving property upon navigable waters
from impending peril.2 The one who gives aid of this nature is a
salvor, and his compensation is a salvage award, payment of which is
secured by an automatic lien upon the salvaged ptoperty.8 Because
courts have long realized that a general willingness to rescue distressed property at sea is beneficial to the shipping industry, salvage
awards have been consistently liberal. 4 Originally only those persons
who h._1d physically participated in a salvage venture and had borne
the brunt of the hazards involved were entitled to awards. As the
vessels from which the salvors worked became more expensive, it
seemed advisable to make awards to the owners in order to induce
them to risk their capital in salvage operations. At the same time,
crew awards were reduced, since the more modern vessels were safer
and most of the dangerous phases of an operation were accomplished
by machinery. At present the owner's award is generally larger than
that of all the crewmen combined.5 While much salvage is still ac•
complished by chance rescuers, there are a number of vessels in
service today specially outfitted for salvage work, manned by full• 349 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case).
I. Nicholas E. Vemicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
2. The Clarita and The Clara, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) I (1874).
3. Jacobson v. Panama Ry., 266 Fed. 344 (2d Cir. 1920).
4. See The Lamington, 86 Fed. 675 (2d Cir. 1898).
5. See generally GILMORE 8: BLACK, ADMIRALTY §§ 8-11 (1957).
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time crews, and kept ready for immediate service. Their owners
normally receive generous awards because these craft are unusually
efficient.6
At issue in the principal case was the right of members of the
crew of nV'o such professional salvage vessels to claim a salvage award.
The court reviewed the few precedents on the question but dismissed
them as inconclusive. In this the court was correct, for a thorough
survey reveals that the prior cases contain nothing but conclusions
or dicta supported only by misinterpretations of previous cases.7
The court then attempted to evaluate the equities of the parties.8
Testimony showed that the wage rate of the tugs' crewmen was
lower than that of their counterparts on conventional Greek harbor
tugs, even though the former regularly worked at ordinary harbor
towage between salvage operations. The court believed, however,
that this evidence, even if accurate, could give rise to either of two
inferences. A lower pay scale, while possibly indicating the crewmen's expectation of receiving salvage awards, might, ori the other
hand, merely show their willingness to work for lower compensation.0 It further appeared that, generally speaking, the risk of physi6. See The Lamington, 86 Fed. 675 (2d Cir. 1898).
7. One of the earliest cases bearing on the question of professional crew awards is
Bowley v. Goddard, 3 Fed. Cas. 1072 (No. 1736) (D. Mass. 1867), where the court noted
in a dictum that, although the crewmen of the salvage vessel involved in the litigation
had contracted for specified wages to cover all their services, they still acted voluntarily
in assisting the salvaged vessel. In The Camanche, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 448 (1869), the
Court held that the owner's right to an award did not abate because his professional
crew had made no claim. It did not go to the merits of the professional crew award
question. Relying upon this decision the court in Browning v. Baker, 4 Fed. Cas. 453
(No. 2041) (E.D. Va. 1875), ruled that the crew's failure to claim a share of the award
indicated its concession of the entire award to the owner. In dictum, however, the
court suggested that no crew award would have been permissible because the seamen
were under contract with the owner.
Apparently the leading case for the proposition that a professional crewman can
waive his claim to a salvage award is The Cetewayo, 9 Fed. 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1881). The
court did not explain the proposition; it did refuse, however, to find a waiver because
there was no showing that the crew engaged in salvage on a regular basis. The court
in The Celtic Chief, 4 Hawaii Fed. 299 (9th Cir. 1916), suggested that a waiver was not
to be implied merely from the fact that a seaman was a professional salvage crewman,
and allowed a crew award because no evidence of actual waiver had been introduced.
The Arakan, 283 Fed. 861 (N.D. Cal. 1922), cited in the principal case, stated by way
of dicta, unsupported by either authority or reasoning, that professional salvage crewmen are ineligible for awards.
8. Admiralty courts have traditionally used broad discretion in determining the
amount of salvage awards. See 33 LAw MAGAZINE&: REv. 300 (1908). It is not surprising,
therefore, that the court in the principal case considered relying upon its sense of
fairness when forced to determine eligibility for an award.
9. The court did not suggest why the crews would be willing to accept the lower
rate of compensation. In some instances professional salvage crewmen receiving regular
wages work at salvage only occasionally, remaining idle between operations. See generally NORRIS, SALVAGE § 81, at 134 n.10 (1958). In the principal case, however, the crewmen worked full time, engaging in harbor towage when salvage work was unavailable.
Principal case at 471.
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cal injury to any professional salvage crewman is lessened by the
specialized equipment on board his vessel.1°
The court did not find in the evidence before it any overwhelming reason for either allowing or denying a crew award. Nevertheless,
it concluded that a modest crew recovery should be permitted in
the instant case simply because the "conscience of admiralty" was
so disposed.11 Although salvage claims are usually negotiated or
arbitrated,12 the ad hoc nature of the court's decision may lead salvage crewmen, or the owners or insurers of salvaged property, to take
future disputes to the federal courts whenever they consider the
equities of the particular situation favorable to their position.
Prediction of the outcome of future salvage litigation may be
facilitated by a thorough review of the professional salvage crew
award question. Such compensation has sometimes been opposed on
the theory that the seaman, by becoming a professional salvage crewman, impliedly either abandons any claim to an award in favor of
accepting steady employment on a salvage vessel, or else bargains the
potential claims away in consideration for his wages. 18 These arguments seem untenable in light of present-day maritime law, which
finds admiralty courts playing the role of the seaman's guardian, protecting him from abuse and overreaching by his employer.14 It seems
anomalous that the same tribunals which place upon the shipowner
an affirmative burden of showing that a release executed by an
injured crewman was signed with full knowledge of the extent of
his injuries as well as of his rights to maintenance, cure, and damages15 should be disposed to hold that a seaman impliedly gave up a
potential salvage claim-at least without determining whether he
knew the nature of his rights and understood that he was foregoing
them. A similar paternalism was manifested by Congress in enacting
sections 600 and 601 of the Shipping Code,18 which invalidate
IO. In the principal case the salvage vessels towed the distressed ships to a mooring
and then, after tying them up, pushed against them to relieve pressure on the mooring
lines. The crews' physical efforts played a very small part in the operation. Sec
Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
11. Principal case at 471.
12. Schimski, Arbitration of Marine Claims at Lloyd's, 12 ARB. J. (n.s.) 96 (1957),
13. See note 7 supra.
14. See Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L. REv. 479 (1954).
15. Id. at 487.
16. REv. STAT. § 4535 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 600 (1964), reads in part: "[E]vcry stipulation by which any seaman consents to abandon his right to his wages in the case of
the loss of the ship, or to abandon any right which he may have or obtain in the
nature of salvage, shall be wholly inoperative." 38 Stat. 1169 (1915), as amended, 46
U.S.C. § 601 (1964), reads in part: "[N]o assignment or sale of wages or of salvage made
prior to the accruing thereof shall bind the party making the same." Seamen engaged in
the coastal trade are excepted from the coverage of § 600 by the Act of June 9, 1874, 18
Stat. 64, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 544 (1964).
None of this legislation could be binding in the principal case because the crewmen and the owners of the salvage vessels were Greek nationals, the vessels were of
Greek registry, and the events giving rise to the litigation occurred outside the juris-
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certain express attempts by seamen to abandon or assign their salvage
rights prior to accrual. This legislation would certainly seem to
suggest a national policy against a court's finding an implied relinquishment of the same rights.
In the principal case, however, the United States appears not to
have argued any type o_f renunciation theory. Instead, it maintained
that the crewmen did not act "voluntarily" toward the naval vessels,
since they were regularly employed for the purpose of saving distressed property. This contention goes to the question of whether a
particular person has rendered a salvage service as defined by admiralty law,17 rather than to the eligibility of one admittedly a salvor
to receive an award.
The flaw in the Government's argument lies in giving too narrow
a definition to the word "voluntary." The mere hope of gain, for
example, does not render service to distressed property involuntary,18
nor does the fact that the rescuer was motivated by the instinct of
self-preservation.19 In fact, previous cases indicate that a salvage
claimant's service is "involuntary" only if he has a pre-existing duty
to either the imperiled property or the community to lend assistance.
A crewman, for example, cannot ordinarily become the salvor of his
own ship, for he has contracted ·to serve the craft at all times irrespective of the hazard involved.20 Public policy is also .furthered by
this rule, since one ineligible for a reward is not tempted to allow his
ship to become imperiled so that he can salvage her.21 In theory, at
least, passengers cannot be salvors, since they have an obligation,
albeit an extrem~ly limited one, stemming from their contract of
carriage, to help their ship in distress.22 A duty to the public at large
diction of the United States. Principal case at 467. See generally Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571 (1953).
The scope of this note does not embrace the questions which may arise when a
professional salvage crewmai:i expressly agrees to forego any salvage claim which may
accrue to his benefit.
17. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
.
18. See NoRIUS, op. cit. supra note 9, § 69. There is authority suggesting that a
professional salvage crewman can act voluntarily toward the distressed vessel. Bowley v.
Goddard, 3 Fed. Cas. 1072 (No. 1736) (D. Mass. 1867).
19. The Lomonosoff, [1921] P. 97 (dictum).
20. E.g., The Tashmoo, 48 F.2d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); The Neptune, I Hagg. 227,
166 Eng. Rep. 81 (Adm. 1824). Under unusual circumstances where the crew has acted
beyond the call of duty, the crewmen may receive a salvage award. The Mary Hale,
16 Fed. Cas. 985 (No. 9213) (S.D. Fla. 1856). One author summarizes these situations
as follows: where their ship was absolutely abandoned without hope of recovery, where
she was totally lost by shipwreck and either went to the bottom or "left her bones on
the shore," where she was taken by a hostile power and later recaptured by the crew,
or where the crew was mistakenly discharged from service prior to salvage. NoRIUS, op.
cit. supra note 9, § 52.
21. See Elrod v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 62 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
22. The Vrede, Lush. 325, 167 Eng. Rep. 143, 144 (Adm. 1861) (Lushington, J.). The
passenger's duty to his ship, of course, is much less exacting than that of the crew. He
may desert the vessel at any time. Furthermore, he is thought to be acting above the
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for whom he works makes "involuntary" the assistance rendered by
a government servant in the usual scope of his employment. Thus,
harbor firemen or Coast Guardsmen bound by law, regulation, or the
nature of their offices to rescue distressed property at sea cannot
normally be salvors.23 Another policy is thereby implemented: the
conduct of public servants will remain untainted by the hope of
personal reward. 24 Professional salvage crewmen, however, are not
bound by contract to the distressed vessel, nor have they agreed to do
the public's bidding. Indeed, it is anomalous to say that these seamen
had an obligation to either the imperiled craft or the community
which would make their assistance "involuntary," when the owner
of their tug, by whose will their activities were governed, had no
similar obligation.25
On the other hand, there are cogent reasons for allowing a modest
award to professional salvage crewmen. Salvage awards are made in
the hope that the prospect of compensation will encourage those
in a position to do so to engage in salvage operations and to carry
them out as efficiently as possible.26 While the professional salvage
crewman will no doubt be prompted by the contract with his employer to lend aid as the latter directs, the expectation of remuneration over and above his usual wages will motivate him to expend his
utmost effort. A crew award also serves the best interests of the salvage vessel's mvner, for the greater the value of the salvaged property
the larger his own compensation is likely to be.27 Furthermore, the
0\vner faces the possibility of receiving little or no award if the value
of the property is lessened through the crew's negligence or intentional misconduct.28 Presumably a crew award would be computed
on the basis of the same considerations used to assess the owner's. The
risk of losing all or part of their mvn award would provide the crewmen with an added incentive to perform carefully and diligently,
thereby lessening the chance of the owner's award being diminished because of their misfeasance.
Although there are good reasons for allowing professional salvage
crew awards and no convincing arguments for prohibiting them,
call of duty and, thus, eligible for a salvage award, when he does more to assist than
simply operate the ship's machinery. See The Connemara, 108 U.S. 352 (1883); Towle
v. The Great Eastern, 24 Fed. Cas. 75 (No. 14,110) (S.D.N.Y. 1864).
23. The Lyman M. Law, 122 Fed. 816 (D.C. Me. 1903) (dictum) (Coast Guardsman);
Davey v. The Mary Frost, 7 Fed. Cas. 14 (No. 3592), affirming 7 Fed. Cas. II (No. 3591)
(E.D. Tex. 1876) (fireman).
24. Thornton v. The Livingston Roe, 90 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
25. It is clear that the owner of a professional salvage vessel is entitled to an
award. See, e.g., The Camanche, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 448 (1869). The government did not
contend that the owners of the tugs in the principal case were not volunteers.
26. Mason v. The Blaireau, 16 Fed. Cas. 1009 (No. 9230) (D. Md. 1803).
27. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869).
28. See Danner v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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these seamen are paid by their employers for engaging in salvage
operations and should not be compensated twice for the same effort.O
To avoid double remuneration, the court should deduct from the
amount it would allow each crewman were he not under contract
with his employer, computed with reference to the same considerations traditionally taken into account when setting the amount of a
chance rescuer's award,3 0 a sum equal to the value of the contractual
benefits each has received attributable to the particular salvage operajion.31 In this way the crewman's reward will approximate the value
of his service over and above that expected of him in his daily dealings with his employer-the very service which a professional salvage
award is designed to encourage.

29. See Slone v. Udle, 6 Newf. Sup. Ct. 217 (1880); cf. text accompanying notes 26 &
27 supra. However, the amount of compensation apart from the award seems irrelevant
in determining whether a salvage claimant was a volunteer. See The Tashmoo, 48 F.2d
366 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); note 7 supra.
30. "Courts of admiralty usually consider the following circumstances as the
main ingredients in determining the amount of the reward to be decreed for
a salvage service: (1). The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service. (2). The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in renderng the
service and saving the property. (3). The value of the property employed by the salvors
in rendering the service, and the danger to which such property was exposed. (4). The
risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the impending peril. (5). The
value of the property saved. (6). The degree of danger from which the property was
rescued." The Blackwell, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 13-14 (1869).
31. A particular crewman's regular befiefits may include more than just the amount
of wages paid him during the time he was actually engaged in a particular operation.
For example, a seaman may receive a monthly wage from the professional salvor but
be expected to engage solely in salvage work and, of course, only when it is available.
See note 9 supra. Assuming that he were called to work an average of only one time
per month, a court could well determine that a full month's pay and fringe benefits
are properly attributable to each salvage operation.

